This is true but really funny. I thought only the 'bankers' are crooks!!! Even pensioners have joined them. They say, bankers did what they did because of too much innovation. These pensioners I think had too little of it. Probably they were bored.
Pradeep
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Candy brothers victims of property swindle
By Jim Pickardin Financial Times
Published: March 20 2009 21:55 | Last updated: March 20 2009 21:55
The Candy brothers, two of London’s best known property entrepreneurs, have emerged as the victims of an audacious swindle perpetrated by four pensioners who pretended to own a 47-acre Berkshire estate.
The quartet have just been jailed for the fraud, in which the Candys and their bankers, HBOS, bought King’s Beeches, a property once owned by the King of Thailand.
The real owner, billionaire Saudi sheikh Khalid Bin Mahfouz, was not aware of the fraudulent sale.
The Berkshire plot was bought in 2004, some time before Nick and Christian Candy rose to prominence as the pair behind some of the most high-end deals in London’s property boom, including the £1bn purchase of Chelsea Barracks last year.
They were gulled into buying the site for £6.5m on the basis of flawed paperwork that wrongly suggested that the fraudsters had been the real owners.
After the fraud was detected, the brothers won a separate civil case against the Land Registry, the guardian of Britain’s land rights, which had inadvertently allowed the Berkshire deal to go ahead.
As a result, the registry had to make its biggest ever compensation payment of £8m, including legal fees, which was shared between the brothers and HBOS.
The Land Registry said on Friday that it had been the victim of forged documents but it was its policy to compensate for any mistakes on its register.
Christian Candy told the FT on Friday night that there was likely to be a rise in the number of similar cases uncovered during the course of the recession.
King’s Beeches had been owned since 1991 by Glenside Holdings (Bermuda), a vehicle of Sheikh Kahlid Bin Mahfouz. In October 2004 the estate was sold, after several back-to-back sales, to a vehicle of Christian Candy.
Unknown to any of the buyers, the fraudsters completed a Land Registry transfer form, using forged signatures, to shift the property from Glenside Holdings to another – entirely innocent – company, Glenside Investments.
As the four men were sent to jail last week, Judge Nicholas Wood said it was a “great shame” to see elderly men committing such a crime.
Michael Downer, 71, was jailed for five years; John Clifford Williams, 65, for two and a half; John Mervyn Jones, 62, for six; and Malcolm Brown, 69, for four years and nine months.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009
Saturday 21 March 2009
Wednesday 18 March 2009
Re: Barack Obama's foreign policy
To
The Editor,
Economist
Sir,
You mention that "Iran may have armed the Taliban but is invited to a 'big tent' meeting on Afganistan".
I think this remark is baseless. Taliban is armed not by Shia Iran but by America's close Sunni allies in Arab World. Making remarks without any proof doesn't do any good to the reputation of an esteemed magazine like Economist.
Just because Iran doesn't approve of West, doesn't mean you can make sense-less accusations.
Regards,
Pradeep Kabra
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Barack Obama's foreign policy
All very engaging
Mar 12th 2009
From The Economist print edition
America’s president has made a good start in foreign policy. But the hard choices are still to come
FOR impeccable reasons, Barack Obama has concentrated since becoming president on fixing America’s economy. On foreign policy, he has only sketched the outline. Soon, however, he must start to fill in some details. Early next month he goes to Europe for the G20 summit on the world economy, NATO’s 60th birthday party in Strasbourg and a meeting with the European Union in Prague. He intends on the same trip to take in Turkey, thus fulfilling a promise to make an early visit to a Muslim country and start mending relations with the Islamic world. When he visited Europe as a candidate last summer, 200,000 Berliners cheered him to the skies. This time, he will be expected to put substance behind the magic.
So far, the outline at least is fine. Mr Obama has resisted the temptation to tear up every one of George Bush’s policies, but he has transformed the tone. The fight against al-Qaeda is to continue, but without the preaching that alienated America’s allies or the torture that betrayed its values. He is pulling out of Iraq, but on a cautious timetable. He is sending more troops to Afghanistan, but reviewing the strategy of a war he admits America is failing to win. He is extending his hand to adversaries, but without yet making America look like a soft touch.
This belief in “engaging” is so far the most visible element of the emerging Obama doctrine. Mr Obama, it seems, is not a man to push foes into a corner or stick rude labels on them, as Mr Bush did. Iran and Syria are no longer rogue regimes beyond polite society: the band formerly known as the “axis of evil” is being summoned to join the conversation. Iran may have armed the Taliban but is invited to a “big tent” meeting on Afghanistan. Syria may have ordered the assassination of a former prime minister of Lebanon, but Hillary Clinton, Mr Obama’s secretary of state, has sent her officials to patch up relations with Bashar Assad. Russia invaded Georgia, but, hey, that was last summer. Now the NATO-Russia Council is to resume meetings and Mr Obama is renewing long-stalled talks with Russia on cutting nuclear weapons (see article).
Those who believe, as the neocons did, that the focus of foreign policy should be to promote liberal democracy, will find much to disapprove of. But a policy of pinching one’s nose and engaging with malodorous regimes has its merits. It treats the world as it is, not as it should be, and it gives awkward customers a chance to change course and co-operate with America without losing face. To foreign-policy realists, that is a nice change from the with-us-or-against-us approach of Mr Bush’s first term, when a lot of countries voted against.
Not just a nice guy, thank goodness
On the other hand, the test of a policy based on realism is whether it delivers results, and engagement on its own, as Mr Bush discovered in his chastened second term, seldom alters the behaviour of regimes that think they are acting rationally in their own vital interests. Look at North Korea, still threatening war after diplomats have spent bottom-numbing years in talks (see article). Or at Iran, which talked and talked to well-meaning Europeans but still insists on its nuclear “rights” (ie, the right to get within a screwdriver’s turn of a bomb). Talk, even from a president as winning as Mr Obama, needs to be accompanied by some hard-edged diplomacy.
Has Mr Obama got the necessary hardness? So it seems. His decision to reinforce the war in Afghanistan while scaling down in Iraq shows that he is not afraid to use America’s military power (though we think he should have stopped America’s counterproductive air raids on terrorists in Pakistan). He recently told Russia that if it helps stop Iran going nuclear, America might drop the plan Russia loathes to station missile defences in Poland and the Czech Republic. This points to a diplomacy based on a shrewd trading of interests, not—despite all that disarming courtesy—a naive faith that noxious regimes will show goodwill just because they are treated with respect.
What remains unclear is not whether Mr Obama is clever or tough. It is his basic reading of the world. Does he see China more as a rival than an ally? Too soon to say. Is Afghanistan winnable? Watch that review. Is Palestine solvable? Mrs Clinton’s recent visit, showing sympathy but changing no policy (Hamas remains beyond the pale), leaves the question dangling. Will he risk pre-emption against Iran or does he believe it can be contained? The mullahs would love to know.
The first big clue to Mr Obama’s instincts may come in his treatment of Russia. A few months ago it looked as if the NATO meeting in April would take place in the shadow of a Russia still in macho mode after the Georgia war and confident of bobbing to riches on oil and gas. To its own surprise, Russia is now a casualty of the world recession.
This does not make America’s policy simpler. A Russia with a wrecked economy may become even less congenial. Mrs Clinton speaks of “managing” differences where they persist, while standing firm on principles and vital interests. But what if interests and principles collide? America says Russia has no right to bully neighbours such as Georgia and Ukraine. But Russia can offer vital help on Iran. So far, Mr Obama has not had to confront these hard choices. Soon he will.
The Editor,
Economist
Sir,
You mention that "Iran may have armed the Taliban but is invited to a 'big tent' meeting on Afganistan".
I think this remark is baseless. Taliban is armed not by Shia Iran but by America's close Sunni allies in Arab World. Making remarks without any proof doesn't do any good to the reputation of an esteemed magazine like Economist.
Just because Iran doesn't approve of West, doesn't mean you can make sense-less accusations.
Regards,
Pradeep Kabra
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Barack Obama's foreign policy
All very engaging
Mar 12th 2009
From The Economist print edition
America’s president has made a good start in foreign policy. But the hard choices are still to come
FOR impeccable reasons, Barack Obama has concentrated since becoming president on fixing America’s economy. On foreign policy, he has only sketched the outline. Soon, however, he must start to fill in some details. Early next month he goes to Europe for the G20 summit on the world economy, NATO’s 60th birthday party in Strasbourg and a meeting with the European Union in Prague. He intends on the same trip to take in Turkey, thus fulfilling a promise to make an early visit to a Muslim country and start mending relations with the Islamic world. When he visited Europe as a candidate last summer, 200,000 Berliners cheered him to the skies. This time, he will be expected to put substance behind the magic.
So far, the outline at least is fine. Mr Obama has resisted the temptation to tear up every one of George Bush’s policies, but he has transformed the tone. The fight against al-Qaeda is to continue, but without the preaching that alienated America’s allies or the torture that betrayed its values. He is pulling out of Iraq, but on a cautious timetable. He is sending more troops to Afghanistan, but reviewing the strategy of a war he admits America is failing to win. He is extending his hand to adversaries, but without yet making America look like a soft touch.
This belief in “engaging” is so far the most visible element of the emerging Obama doctrine. Mr Obama, it seems, is not a man to push foes into a corner or stick rude labels on them, as Mr Bush did. Iran and Syria are no longer rogue regimes beyond polite society: the band formerly known as the “axis of evil” is being summoned to join the conversation. Iran may have armed the Taliban but is invited to a “big tent” meeting on Afghanistan. Syria may have ordered the assassination of a former prime minister of Lebanon, but Hillary Clinton, Mr Obama’s secretary of state, has sent her officials to patch up relations with Bashar Assad. Russia invaded Georgia, but, hey, that was last summer. Now the NATO-Russia Council is to resume meetings and Mr Obama is renewing long-stalled talks with Russia on cutting nuclear weapons (see article).
Those who believe, as the neocons did, that the focus of foreign policy should be to promote liberal democracy, will find much to disapprove of. But a policy of pinching one’s nose and engaging with malodorous regimes has its merits. It treats the world as it is, not as it should be, and it gives awkward customers a chance to change course and co-operate with America without losing face. To foreign-policy realists, that is a nice change from the with-us-or-against-us approach of Mr Bush’s first term, when a lot of countries voted against.
Not just a nice guy, thank goodness
On the other hand, the test of a policy based on realism is whether it delivers results, and engagement on its own, as Mr Bush discovered in his chastened second term, seldom alters the behaviour of regimes that think they are acting rationally in their own vital interests. Look at North Korea, still threatening war after diplomats have spent bottom-numbing years in talks (see article). Or at Iran, which talked and talked to well-meaning Europeans but still insists on its nuclear “rights” (ie, the right to get within a screwdriver’s turn of a bomb). Talk, even from a president as winning as Mr Obama, needs to be accompanied by some hard-edged diplomacy.
Has Mr Obama got the necessary hardness? So it seems. His decision to reinforce the war in Afghanistan while scaling down in Iraq shows that he is not afraid to use America’s military power (though we think he should have stopped America’s counterproductive air raids on terrorists in Pakistan). He recently told Russia that if it helps stop Iran going nuclear, America might drop the plan Russia loathes to station missile defences in Poland and the Czech Republic. This points to a diplomacy based on a shrewd trading of interests, not—despite all that disarming courtesy—a naive faith that noxious regimes will show goodwill just because they are treated with respect.
What remains unclear is not whether Mr Obama is clever or tough. It is his basic reading of the world. Does he see China more as a rival than an ally? Too soon to say. Is Afghanistan winnable? Watch that review. Is Palestine solvable? Mrs Clinton’s recent visit, showing sympathy but changing no policy (Hamas remains beyond the pale), leaves the question dangling. Will he risk pre-emption against Iran or does he believe it can be contained? The mullahs would love to know.
The first big clue to Mr Obama’s instincts may come in his treatment of Russia. A few months ago it looked as if the NATO meeting in April would take place in the shadow of a Russia still in macho mode after the Georgia war and confident of bobbing to riches on oil and gas. To its own surprise, Russia is now a casualty of the world recession.
This does not make America’s policy simpler. A Russia with a wrecked economy may become even less congenial. Mrs Clinton speaks of “managing” differences where they persist, while standing firm on principles and vital interests. But what if interests and principles collide? America says Russia has no right to bully neighbours such as Georgia and Ukraine. But Russia can offer vital help on Iran. So far, Mr Obama has not had to confront these hard choices. Soon he will.
Thursday 12 March 2009
Re: It's an emergency: get your act together, Obama
To
The Editor,
Times
Dear Sir,
This article writer Mr. Anatole Kaletsky doesn't know what he is talking about.
For instance, he says "Germans want to regulate hedge funds, policies that may or may not be desirable, but which have nothing to do with the present crisis" - Has Mr. Kaletsky lost his mind. The present crisis is primarily due to Hedge Fund Managers & Private Equity Players (whether they are purely hedge funds or part of investment banks or part of Sovereign wealth funds or part of banks is immaterial). This is an indisputable fact. Unlike the 1999 crisis when the hedge fund LTME was burnt, this time they got smarter and were not first in the queue. But they were the brains behind all the CDO's and SIV's.
Secondly, the article states that "None of these policies would be painful to voters, since they would involve easier financial conditions, lower taxes, more jobs and stronger guarantees for savings. Why then are they proving so hard to put into practice? " - Is he crazy again to say that none of the measures would be painful to the voters. The whole exercise will be a curse to the voters for the next 20-30 years in the form of extra taxes, low investment in utilities and infrastructure and thereby lower standard of living.
Personally I feel either Mr. Kaletsky is naive or is working for a hedge fund or owns a hedge fund.
Regards,
Pradeep Kabra
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
From The Times
March 12, 2009
It's an emergency: get your act together, Obama
As the world's finance ministers gather in London the greatest danger to the global economy is America's failure of resolve
Anatole Kaletsky
This could be the week when the greatest financial crisis in history finally reached its nadir. Then again, it could merely be another week in which a brief rally in global stock markets has suckered more investors, politicians and commentators into assuming that the worst is over, when the tentative improvement in financial confidence is just another false dawn.
So which will it be? The answer depends, even more than usual, on the finance ministers and central bankers gathering at a potentially chaotic G20 meeting this weekend. The omens are not benign.
It is now understood that the global financial system can be stabilised and economic demand revived only through government intervention. Private businesses and consumers do not have the access to credit or the confidence to start spending and investing again. But government intervention will work only with some degree of international co-operation and that requires leadership from America. Yet despite the mandate won by President Obama, Washington has proved muddled in its economic priorities and indecisive in its financial response to the crisis.
International co-operation is necessary because of the global linkages of trade and finance. Any country that allows a bank to fail spreads financial contagion to every other nation. And any country that cuts taxes or boosts public spending or expands its money supply, creates demand not only for its own businesses and workers, but also for the world as a whole.
The upshot is that financial guarantees, fiscal stimulus and credit expansion, will be much more effective and less expensive for each country if they are implemented in a co-ordinated way. By contrast, imagine a global free-for-all, in which some nations subsidise their banks while others try to punish bankers; in which some central banks print money while others grumble about Zimbabwe and Weimar; in which some governments promise to spend their way out of recession while others denounce this as the road to perdition and call for belt-tightening in the public sector. Not only would such divergent policies cancel one another out at the global level, they would also deal another blow to confidence in the world financial system.
But how can global co-operation be achieved when governments around the world seem to have completely divergent economic philosophies and agendas for this weekend? Gordon Brown wants to close down tax havens, while the Germans want to regulate hedge funds, policies that may or may not be desirable, but which have nothing to do with the present crisis. The US is demanding that Germany, Japan and China announce new programmes of public spending and tax cuts - which is simply not going to happen, either this weekend or at the G20 summit next month. The financial markets, meanwhile, are hoping for a $500billion increase in the IMF funds available to rescue insolvent governments, but this does not seem a high priority for any of the G20 governments, except perhaps the Germans, who fear the cost of bailing out Latvia, Hungary, Austria, Greece and the Irish Republic will otherwise fall on them.
Past experience of such international negotiations shows that American leadership is necessary for reaching any kind of agreement. Which brings us to the greatest risk facing the world economy: Mr Obama's failure to present a credible response to the financial crisis or even to assemble a proper economic policy team. After the British Government's leaked messages of despair about nobody answering the phone at the US Treasury in the preparations for the G20, everybody is now aware that Mr Obama has nominated only two out of 18 deputy and assistant Treasury secretaries. What is less widely recognised is that this decision-making vacuum reflects a deeply worrying feature of US economic policy.
American politicians simply don't seem to understand the existential threat that their economy is now facing. Instead of uniting to deal with a national emergency far more threatening to their way of life than the terrorist attacks of 9/11, they have responded by dividing more sharply than ever into hostile partisan camps.
Efforts to revive economic activity and to stabilise the financial system that are clearly indispensable on the basis of any economic analysis, whether Keynesian or monetarist or plain business-sense, have been denounced on the Right for interfering with free markets and on the Left for feather-bedding bankers. Instead of rallying around in a moment of crisis, many Americans are openly expressing their hope that the new President will fail and the economy collapse. Candidates for key Treasury posts have been viciously attacked in the media and Congress for trivial tax and administrative infractions inadvertently committed many years ago or simply for having once worked on Wall Street. As a result, these jobs have become almost impossible to fill.
Mr Obama himself seems to have attached a surprisingly low priority to dealing with the financial crisis. He had, for example, selected key State Department officials, from Hillary Clinton downwards even before his inauguration. He has managed to get dozens of these confirmed by Congress in the past two months and immediately put his personal stamp on US foreign policy. Yet there has been no similar focus on creating a properly functioning economic team or launching a coherent new response to the financial crisis.
The lack of urgency, of focus and of national unity in America's response to the financial crisis is the most surprising - and most dangerous - threat to our chances of recovery. With clear American leadership, a global policy to stabilise the banks and pull the world out of recession could readily be agreed. All the main elements of such a policy - lower taxes, public works programmes, monetary and credit expansion, cast-iron government guarantees for recapitalised banks - are broadly agreed among economists and endorsed by global institutions such as the IMF.
None of these policies would be painful to voters, since they would involve easier financial conditions, lower taxes, more jobs and stronger guarantees for savings. Why then are they proving so hard to put into practice? Is it because many Americans would rather see their economy collapse than a Democratic President succeed? If so, then perhaps the Marxists now enjoying a new lease of life will have been right all along: American capitalism will have proved a decadent civilisation at the end of its global hegemony and doomed to self-destruction.
The Editor,
Times
Dear Sir,
This article writer Mr. Anatole Kaletsky doesn't know what he is talking about.
For instance, he says "Germans want to regulate hedge funds, policies that may or may not be desirable, but which have nothing to do with the present crisis" - Has Mr. Kaletsky lost his mind. The present crisis is primarily due to Hedge Fund Managers & Private Equity Players (whether they are purely hedge funds or part of investment banks or part of Sovereign wealth funds or part of banks is immaterial). This is an indisputable fact. Unlike the 1999 crisis when the hedge fund LTME was burnt, this time they got smarter and were not first in the queue. But they were the brains behind all the CDO's and SIV's.
Secondly, the article states that "None of these policies would be painful to voters, since they would involve easier financial conditions, lower taxes, more jobs and stronger guarantees for savings. Why then are they proving so hard to put into practice? " - Is he crazy again to say that none of the measures would be painful to the voters. The whole exercise will be a curse to the voters for the next 20-30 years in the form of extra taxes, low investment in utilities and infrastructure and thereby lower standard of living.
Personally I feel either Mr. Kaletsky is naive or is working for a hedge fund or owns a hedge fund.
Regards,
Pradeep Kabra
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
From The Times
March 12, 2009
It's an emergency: get your act together, Obama
As the world's finance ministers gather in London the greatest danger to the global economy is America's failure of resolve
Anatole Kaletsky
This could be the week when the greatest financial crisis in history finally reached its nadir. Then again, it could merely be another week in which a brief rally in global stock markets has suckered more investors, politicians and commentators into assuming that the worst is over, when the tentative improvement in financial confidence is just another false dawn.
So which will it be? The answer depends, even more than usual, on the finance ministers and central bankers gathering at a potentially chaotic G20 meeting this weekend. The omens are not benign.
It is now understood that the global financial system can be stabilised and economic demand revived only through government intervention. Private businesses and consumers do not have the access to credit or the confidence to start spending and investing again. But government intervention will work only with some degree of international co-operation and that requires leadership from America. Yet despite the mandate won by President Obama, Washington has proved muddled in its economic priorities and indecisive in its financial response to the crisis.
International co-operation is necessary because of the global linkages of trade and finance. Any country that allows a bank to fail spreads financial contagion to every other nation. And any country that cuts taxes or boosts public spending or expands its money supply, creates demand not only for its own businesses and workers, but also for the world as a whole.
The upshot is that financial guarantees, fiscal stimulus and credit expansion, will be much more effective and less expensive for each country if they are implemented in a co-ordinated way. By contrast, imagine a global free-for-all, in which some nations subsidise their banks while others try to punish bankers; in which some central banks print money while others grumble about Zimbabwe and Weimar; in which some governments promise to spend their way out of recession while others denounce this as the road to perdition and call for belt-tightening in the public sector. Not only would such divergent policies cancel one another out at the global level, they would also deal another blow to confidence in the world financial system.
But how can global co-operation be achieved when governments around the world seem to have completely divergent economic philosophies and agendas for this weekend? Gordon Brown wants to close down tax havens, while the Germans want to regulate hedge funds, policies that may or may not be desirable, but which have nothing to do with the present crisis. The US is demanding that Germany, Japan and China announce new programmes of public spending and tax cuts - which is simply not going to happen, either this weekend or at the G20 summit next month. The financial markets, meanwhile, are hoping for a $500billion increase in the IMF funds available to rescue insolvent governments, but this does not seem a high priority for any of the G20 governments, except perhaps the Germans, who fear the cost of bailing out Latvia, Hungary, Austria, Greece and the Irish Republic will otherwise fall on them.
Past experience of such international negotiations shows that American leadership is necessary for reaching any kind of agreement. Which brings us to the greatest risk facing the world economy: Mr Obama's failure to present a credible response to the financial crisis or even to assemble a proper economic policy team. After the British Government's leaked messages of despair about nobody answering the phone at the US Treasury in the preparations for the G20, everybody is now aware that Mr Obama has nominated only two out of 18 deputy and assistant Treasury secretaries. What is less widely recognised is that this decision-making vacuum reflects a deeply worrying feature of US economic policy.
American politicians simply don't seem to understand the existential threat that their economy is now facing. Instead of uniting to deal with a national emergency far more threatening to their way of life than the terrorist attacks of 9/11, they have responded by dividing more sharply than ever into hostile partisan camps.
Efforts to revive economic activity and to stabilise the financial system that are clearly indispensable on the basis of any economic analysis, whether Keynesian or monetarist or plain business-sense, have been denounced on the Right for interfering with free markets and on the Left for feather-bedding bankers. Instead of rallying around in a moment of crisis, many Americans are openly expressing their hope that the new President will fail and the economy collapse. Candidates for key Treasury posts have been viciously attacked in the media and Congress for trivial tax and administrative infractions inadvertently committed many years ago or simply for having once worked on Wall Street. As a result, these jobs have become almost impossible to fill.
Mr Obama himself seems to have attached a surprisingly low priority to dealing with the financial crisis. He had, for example, selected key State Department officials, from Hillary Clinton downwards even before his inauguration. He has managed to get dozens of these confirmed by Congress in the past two months and immediately put his personal stamp on US foreign policy. Yet there has been no similar focus on creating a properly functioning economic team or launching a coherent new response to the financial crisis.
The lack of urgency, of focus and of national unity in America's response to the financial crisis is the most surprising - and most dangerous - threat to our chances of recovery. With clear American leadership, a global policy to stabilise the banks and pull the world out of recession could readily be agreed. All the main elements of such a policy - lower taxes, public works programmes, monetary and credit expansion, cast-iron government guarantees for recapitalised banks - are broadly agreed among economists and endorsed by global institutions such as the IMF.
None of these policies would be painful to voters, since they would involve easier financial conditions, lower taxes, more jobs and stronger guarantees for savings. Why then are they proving so hard to put into practice? Is it because many Americans would rather see their economy collapse than a Democratic President succeed? If so, then perhaps the Marxists now enjoying a new lease of life will have been right all along: American capitalism will have proved a decadent civilisation at the end of its global hegemony and doomed to self-destruction.
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